For married men, we find the conventional view of retirement trends -that the long term trend to early retirement has been reversed --is partially contradicted by recent data. Specifically, descriptive data collected from both the Census and the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) suggest that for those in their fifties, over the periods 1992 to 1998 and 1998 to 2004, the trend to early retirement reasserted itself and labor force participation fell. In contrast, for those in their sixties, there was an increase in work. Similarly, for those 65 and over, the amount of work increased.
I. Introduction
Most of the twentieth century was characterized by a decline in the labor force participation rates of older men (Costa, 1998) . After 1985, the trend to earlier retirement of men seems to have ceased (Quinn, 2002) . There has been disagreement over whether the leveling of the trend to earlier retirement is permanent or temporary (Costa 1999 vs. Quinn 1999 . But there is no controversy in the literature over the observation that the trend has at least leveled (U.S.
Social Security Administration, Technical Report of Expert Panel, 2003) . There is much less controversy over the observation that labor force participation of older women has been increasing in recent decades, a finding that goes hand-in-hand with the large increase in the labor force participation of women of all ages over recent decades. Now a variety of researchers are finding that the trend to earlier retirement of men may not only have stabilized, but may have recently reversed. Much of the evidence for a reversal of the retirement trend is based on data on retirement expectations by those who are still in the labor force (Willis in ongoing work for the HRS, and Maestas, 2006) .
What is happening to the labor force participation rate of older men, and why it is happening, is an empirical question that must sort through the effects of conflicting forces.
Market pressures created by the aging of the baby boomers are encouraging later retirements.
Government policies have been changed to encourage delayed retirement. These include the abolition of mandatory retirement and the adoption of rules prohibiting age discrimination. Firm and government policies together have fostered trends in pensions away from defined benefit plans and toward defined contribution and hybrid pensions that also encourage later retirement.
On the other side of the ledger, rising incomes encourage earlier retirement. Rapid advances in technology, the rise of international competition and the decline of unionized, durable goods and other industries are also exerting pressures fostering earlier retirement. This paper faces two challenges. The first is to accurately describe recent retirement trends, and to put those trends in context. While the path for women is clear, the challenge here is to determine whether the reversal in the trend to earlier retirement for men has continued into recent years, or whether the trend to earlier retirement has again reasserted itself.
The second challenge is to isolate the contribution of changing Social Security rules in shaping these trends. The balance of changes in Social Security policies introduced over the past two decades increase the reward to those who defer receipt of Social Security benefits, encouraging delayed retirement. Other changes in Social Security policies, such as the reduction in the overall level of benefits associated with the increase in normal retirement age, also encourage delayed retirement.
Although we know the overall direction of the effects of Social Security changes on retirement, the challenge is to determine the size of these effects. A wide array of forces is shaping retirement behavior. To isolate the retirement effects of changes in Social Security policies, we must standardize for the effects of all of these other forces. To accomplish this goal, we estimate a model dynamic, stochastic model of retirement and saving. With this model we can hold constant the preferences of potential retirees. We also can hold constant all the other forces specified in the budget constraint, wages, incentives from pensions, layoffs and other factors influencing retirement. We then simulate the effects of changes in Social Security rules.
In particular, using a consistent set of preferences and standardizing for other determinants of retirement incentives in the budget set, simulations are run using Social Security rules applicable to the original HRS cohort, and then again to those born six and twelve years later. The retirement changes simulated by the model are then matched against those observed in the descriptive data.
This methodology allows us to standardize for the influence of time effects; that is of events that uniquely affect the different cohorts because they occur at different ages for the members of the different cohorts. Our approach standardizes not only for the effects of changes in demand for members of different cohorts over time, but also for unique events such as the stock market boom which affected members of different cohorts at different stages of their life cycles, allowing those in some cohorts to recover more easily than others.
II. Descriptive Statistics
This section presents descriptive data on retirement outcomes. The analysis is based on data from the Health and Retirement Study and CPS data.
The Health and Retirement Study adds a new cohort every six years, which determines the spread between cohorts in our analysis. Table 1 shows the various birth cohorts to be compared, the years in which the comparisons will be made, 1992, 1998 and 2004 , and the ages of members of each cohort in the indicated years. There are three groups of 50 to 56 year olds. The descriptive data are presented in Table 2 . There we defined full time work, partial retirement and full retirement using hours per year of work. A person is said to work full time if hours per year of work are 1250 or higher; to be partially retired if hours of work range from 100 to 1249, and are fully retired if hours of work are 99 or lower.
Contrary to the suggestions in the current literature, according to the data in Table 2 But again, in contradiction to the findings in the current literature, the fraction of 51 to 56 year old males fully retired (i.e., working less than 100 hours per year) increased from 16.2 percentage points in 1998 to 19.4 percent in 2004. With standard deviations of between 0.8 and only 11 birth years, so it could not be divided up into two 6 year groups corresponding to the later cohorts. As a result, as the HRS cohorts are moved through time, one has to change either the birth cohorts or the age ranges. 3 For similar reasons to those noted in footnote 2, the 61-67 group in 2004 was born in 1937-1942, not 1936-1941 . That is, in order to keep the same age range in 2004 as in 1998, we borrowed a birth year from the war babies cohort. Of course, we also know that changes in Social Security are encouraging later retirement.
The question will be whether the changes in Social Security help to explain the outcomes, why those in their fifties are retiring earlier in later years and those over 65 are retiring later; or whether the effects of the changes in Social Security will add to the mystery.
Comparing Retirement Trends in HRS data to those in CPS data.
It is useful to compare the descriptive findings based on the Health and Retirement Study with data from the Current Population Survey. Although the CPS data cannot be used to construct the model of retirement and saving, they are an obvious standard of comparison.
Finding the same trends in CPS and HRS data will help to establish the relevance of using HRS data to understand these trends. Table 3 presents the trends for those 50 to 54 years old in the HRS and CPS. Figure 1 reports comparisons for other age groups. The retirement trends are similar between the two surveys. Most important from the perspective of the present study, for men in their early fifties, employment population ratios decline between 1992 and 2004, and for those in their late fifties, there is a decline between 1998 and 2004. In contrast, for those in their sixties, there is an increase in the employment population ratio, with the strongest increase for those 65 and over. Figure 2 shows that for women fifty and over, the trend to increased labor force participation is found consistently through all age groups.
III. Empirical Estimates of the Retirement Model. 4
Our strategy is to use a structural model of retirement and saving, estimated with data from the Health and Retirement Study, to simulate the effects of changing the rules for Social Security. In this standard life cycle model individuals maximize expected utility subject to an 4 The model we use was estimated in a previous paper for the Michigan Retirement Research Center, Gustman and Steinmeier (2006) . The description of the model and the baseline estimation in Section III are taken directly from our earlier study. The simulations in Section IV are original to this paper. asset evolution constraint. Consumption and leisure over the lifetime are the choice variables in the model. The stochastic variables include the returns to assets, mortality outcomes, and retirement preferences. Potential wages and health are treated as exogenous and non-stochastic.
In the model, for each year i, the individual chooses consumption C and leisure L to maximize expected utility:
L takes on a value of 1 if the individual is retired, 0 if he or she is working, and 0.5 if the individual is partially retired. h t indicates the strength of the individual's preference for retirement, which may vary from one person to the next. ρ is the time preference rate, which also may vary from one person to the next.
The model is estimated for married men. The income of the spouse is assumed to be exogenous and non-stochastic. The index m takes on three values indicating whether both members of the couple survive until year t, only the husband survives, or only the spouse survives. s m,t is the probability that the household will have the composition described by m in year t. T corresponds to the maximum age beyond which the household's survival probabilities are too small to matter.
The asset constraint is given by
A t is the level of assets in year t, and r t is the stochastic return on those assets in year t .
Assets are assumed to start out at 0 at the beginning of the working life and are not permitted to be negative. W t is the wage rate at time t, which will depend on whether the individual has stayed on his or her career job, which we also label as his or her main job, or has previously retired and is going back to work. The career (main) job is considered to be the job the individual holds until he fully or partially retires for the first time. The term E m,t is the income accruing to the spouse, including earnings and pensions. The spouse is assumed to have a retirement date unaffected by the individual's choices, and the term is taken to be zero in states where the spouse is no longer alive. B m,t is the amount of the individual's pension and the household's Social Security benefits, both of which will be affected by the individual's retirement decisions. For defined benefit pensions, the benefit amount is determined by the retirement date and continues until death. For defined contribution pensions, the contributions are put into an account and allowed to accrue subject to the same stochastic return as is applied to assets. The account is assumed to be made available to the individual when the individual retires from the career job. Household Social Security benefits are calculated according to the Social Security rules, depending on previous retirement decisions and the composition of the surviving household. Since most individuals claim benefits as soon as eligible (Coile et al., 2002; Gustman and Steinmeier, 2002) , we do not try to model the acceptance decision here and instead assume that the individuals will claim the benefits as soon as they can, consistent with the earnings test.
Individuals are assumed to be heterogeneous with regard to both their time preference rate and their retirement preferences. With regard to time preference, we assume that ρ has a different value for different individuals and essentially treat it as a fixed effect in the estimation. The linear form βX t has three terms: a constant, age, and health status. The coefficient of age is taken to be positive, so that retirement gradually becomes more desirable as the individual ages and suffers from the cumulative effects of nature's aging. Note that there is no term which makes the individual suddenly more desirous of retirement at 62, 65, or any other particular age; this means that any spikes in retirement in the simulations are the result of idiosyncracies in the opportunity set, and not the result of preferences.
The ε t term in h t reflects the individual's relative preference for leisure. An individual starts out with a value of ε drawn from a distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation σ ε and keeps this value until he or she retires from the career job. Upon retirement, the individual may find that retirement is more or less fulfilling than anticipated, or perhaps the individual may find that he values consumption relatively more than he had thought. In any case, experience allows the value of ε to change after retirement, and the model reflects this by allowing the value of ε t to vary after retirement, with values in successive years correlated with a correlation parameter ρ ε . If the individual finds that retirement is substantially less fulfilling than anticipated, a return to work, albeit at a reduced wage as compared to the career job, may be the optimal decision. The data suggest that partial retirement becomes relatively more common at later ages.
At age 60, partially retired workers are 10% of those working, with the figure rising to 19% at age 62 and 54% at age 68. To accommodate the evidently increasing relative attractiveness of part-time work, we make δ a function of age: δ = δ 0 + δ a Age. If δ a is positive, the distribution of V p shifts to the right over time, so that part-time work becomes relatively more attractive to full-time work, and hence more common. Individuals are assumed to maintain the same relative position in the distribution of V p 's even as that distribution shifts over time. The heterogeneity relates to where they are in that distribution. A similar problem occurs with respect to health, which when adverse greatly reduces the amount of partial retirement. When we tried to introduce health into the δ term in the same way we introduced age, the coefficient tended toward minus infinity, indicating that when a health problem causes an individual to retire, it usually causes complete retirement rather than partial retirement. To reflect these results, the value of V p is set to 0.5 for individuals with health problems.
The individual carries several state variables from one period to the next; these are variables which are consequences of past decisions and random events which have a bearing on the current decision. Five state variables are applicable in all periods. These are the level of assets A t , the time preference rate ρ, the level of overall leisure preferences ε t , the relative utility of part-time leisure V p , and whether or not the individual is still in the career job. If the individual is still in the career job and that job has a defined contribution pension, there is another state variable relating to the size of the defined contribution balance. After the individual has left the career job, additional state variables related to the value of defined benefit pension amounts and Social Security benefits are introduced. Before retirement from the career job, the defined benefit and Social Security amounts are completely determined from the fact that the individual is still in the career job and thus do not have to be included as separate state variables.
To summarize, the utility function contains three elements which are heterogeneous between different individuals. They are (1) the time preference rate ρ, (2) the initial value of the overall leisure preference term ε, and (3) the relative attractiveness of part-time vs. full time work, as reflected in V p . In the estimation and subsequent simulations, the time preference rate is taken as a fixed effect whose value is calculated for each individual, while V p and the initial value of ε are treated as random effects whose values are drawn from the specified distributions.
As with any stochastic dynamic model, the solution of the model proceeds backwards. In the estimations and simulations, the model uses a grid with 40 points for assets, 10 for defined contribution balances, 17 for overall retirement preferences, 6 for partial retirement preferences, and 4 each for pensions and Social Security values. The number of calculations each period is related to the product of the number of points for each of these variables, multiplied again by the two categories for the career job variable.
The Data
The model is estimated with data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS Wealth is measured in the 1992 survey and is used only to get an estimate of the respondent's time preference, which as indicated before is regarded as a fixed effect in the model. Roughly speaking, time preference is taken to be the value for which the observed wealth is consistent with the wealth that would be generated by the model. In this regard, wealth is considered to be wealth that could be used to finance retirement beyond the amounts available from pension and Social Security income, and includes financial wealth, real estate, and business assets. Given the likelihood of measurement error in the wealth of individual respondents, we do not try to use information about the measured increases or decreases in wealth between surveys in the course of estimating the model.
Lifetime resources include a number of components. For about three-quarters of the sample, earnings are reflected in attached Social Security records, adjusted by self reported information for cases over the earnings maximum or for uncovered jobs. The remaining individuals have earnings histories constructed from self reports about current and last jobs, other jobs lasting longer than 5 years, and information about the total number of years worked.
Projecting the future potential earnings that the worker would have on the career job is done by using the experience and tenure coefficients from estimated wage equations. 3 Projecting the potential earnings for a worker who retires and then returns to full-time work is done by adjusting the tenure coefficients to zero.
Pension information is available for about two-thirds of individuals with pensions. For defined benefit pensions, the annuity is calculated based on the summary plan description provided by the firm. For defined contribution pensions, the contribution amounts are calculated year by year, and the balances are allowed to grow within the model at the stochastic rate of return. Social Security benefit amounts for various potential retirement dates are calculated according to the Social Security rules, assuming the respondents collect benefits when eligible to do so and allowing for the earnings test.
The earnings and pension income of the spouse are calculated and, for the purposes of this model, are taken as exogenous and non-stochastic in order to keep the model computationally tractable. Also taken as exogenous are inheritances and other types of income.
Income and capital gains related to assets, of course, are treated as part of the stochastic rate of return to assets.
The prospective distribution of rates of return is based on the historical series calculated by Ibbotson Associates (2002) for various asset classes from 1926 through 2001. To combine these figures into a single rate of return, we look at households in the HRS who had at least some stocks and/or bonds. We rank these households by total financial assets and take the middle 10 percent of the households to assess the distribution of assets among stocks, long-term bonds, and short-term financial instruments. We find that, on average, about 50 percent of these assets are in stocks, 5 percent in bonds, and 45 percent in bank accounts and certificates of deposit. We proxy the returns on these assets by using the Ibbotson returns for large company stocks, longterm government bonds, and treasury bills, respectively. The arithmetic mean of the returns for this weighted average of securities is 5.3% with a standard deviation of 11%, and the geometric mean is 4.7%. These returns are assumed to be uncorrelated year-to-year, which is approximately true in the actual data. Assuming zero correlation has the advantage that it eliminates the necessity to introduce another state variable for the returns to assets.
The final sample consists of 2,231 respondents for whom we can construct, at least approximately, the details of their earnings and income opportunities, and for whom the model seems appropriate. This is slightly less than half of the number of married men available in the original HRS sample.
Estimation of the model.
The parameters estimated for the model include the consumption parameter α, the standard deviation σ ε for the retirement preference variable ε, the correlation ρ ε of the values of ε once the individual leaves the main job, the two coefficients δ 0 and δ a which describe the distribution of V p , and the coefficients in the linear term βX t which affects retirement preferences. These coefficients include β o , the constants, β a , the coefficient of age, and β h , the coefficient of health.
Each of these parameters have specific implications for the observed pattern of retirement. The estimation procedure in effect uses these implications to help to identify the values of the parameters. β o determines the average age of retirement, and σ ε governs the range of retirement ages. β a is perhaps the most important parameter for our purposes, since it determines the sensitivity of retirement to economic incentives. In this model, the individual retires when the utility from retirement grows to more than offset the utility of the extra income from working. If β a is high, the utility of retirement is increasing very rapidly with age, and changes in economic incentives would have to be very large in order to affect the retirement age by much. The opposite is true if β a is relatively low. ρ ε affects the probability of returning to work after retirement; if ρ ε is low, then individuals may experience large shifts in retirement preferences after retiring, and a return to work is more likely. δ 0 mainly affects the percentage of individuals who partially retire, and δ a governs how this percentage changes with age. α affects how retirement varies with general lifetime income. If α is near unity, then the marginal utility of income diminishes little at high income levels, and high income workers should retire later in order to reap the benefits of their higher wages. The opposite is true if α is non-trivially negative. Finally, β h reflects the degree to which bad health encourages retirement, over and above its impact through earnings.
To estimate these parameters, we use the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) method. The GMM estimator begins with a series of moments, which are nothing more that the difference between some observed characteristic of the sample and the expected value of that The notation for the discussion of GMM is taken from Greene (2000) but is similar to the notation in many other econometric texts.
where θ is the vector of parameters to be estimated and G is the derivative of the moments with respect to the parameters.
We note a couple of caveats with regard to the estimation procedure. The first has to do with the time preference parameter, which we mentioned before would be treated as a fixed effect in the estimation. As a result, there is no single estimated parameter for time preference.
Rather, for each individual, the value of the time preference parameter is such that, given the values of the other parameters, the resulting value of calculated wealth in 1992 is just equal to the actual value of wealth. In general, high values of wealth are associated with low time preference rate parameters and vice verse, although this relationship may be affected if the individual is expecting high pension or Social Security benefit streams. In some cases, assets are higher than would be expected even at a zero time preference rate; we take this as evidence that the time preference rate is low and assign it a value of zero. At the other extreme, an individual with zero assets is assigned a high enough time preference rate to insure that such an individual consumes all income in every period.
To simplify the calculation of time preference and keep the calculations tractable, we ask what time preference would generate the savings corresponding to the respondent's observed level of assets in 1992, given the expected retirement date and its associated income flows. To do this, we calculate a simplified version of the model with stochastic returns but with labor supply fixed at the expected (or actual) retirement date. The solution of the model is a contingent decision tree with consumption at any age contingent on assets and realized returns. To get the computed assets at any age, we assume that the individual initially has zero assets. In each year, the assets from the previous year are increased by the observed return that year, and the contingent consumption decision implies the amount of assets that will be carried over into the next year. This process is continued until 1992, when the asset level is observed. The contingent decision tree for the model depends on the individual's time preference rate, and the time preference rate can be adjusted until the calculated assets just match the observed assets.
We simulate the model 10,000 times for each observation. For each simulation, we start the individual with zero assets and take a random draw for the unobserved stochastic retirement preference variable ε. For each year, given the assets at the beginning of that year, the consumption and work decisions are given by the contingent decision tree, using the observed values of the rate of return. The retirement distribution is cumulated over the simulations and is used to calculate the moments. More properly, this estimation technique should be called the Generalized Method of Simulated Moments, since we use simulated moments rather than theoretical moments. Since the number of simulations is large, however, the simulated moments should be very good approximations to the theoretical moments, and the resulting estimates should be almost identical to those using theoretical moments.
Parameter estimates.
The coefficients estimated by the simulated GMM procedure are reported in Table 4 .
The estimated coefficients are all significantly different from zero by conventional standards. Of particular importance, the coefficient of the age variable implies that retirement leisure is increasing in value by 5.4 percent per year. This relatively low value means that economic incentives should be able to have considerable influence on retirement. The autocorrelation coefficient for the leisure preference term is significantly less than unity, which means that individuals can experience changes in their perception of retirement after they begin to experience it. If they find retirement less attractive than anticipated, they may well reverse course and go back to work for a while, at least until the inexorable march of age finally makes retirement appealing again. Poor health increases the value of retirement leisure by approximately the same amount as being over seven years older.
The overall fit of the model is measured by the q-statistic. If the model is correct, the departures of the observed moments from their theoretical means should be random, and the q- A key to understanding the distribution of full and partial retirement with age is in the time preference rates. These rates are quite heterogeneous. Half the population exhibits time preference rates below 5 percent and may be expected to respond relatively strongly to delayed incentives. On the other hand, over a third exhibits time preference rates of 20 percent or greater and may be expected essentially to respond only to incentives which affect current consumption. Table 5 reports observed retirement outcomes, and simulated retirement outcomes under the current program, with each included individual having the work history actually experienced, and reflected in own Social Security earnings record and reported job history. The spike in retirements from full time work at age 62 is approximately the right height, although the spike at age 65 is a couple of percentage points too low. Comparing the flow into full retirement, the spike at 62 is a couple of points low, but the spike at 65 is approximately the right height.
The simulations also do a fairly good job of matching reverse flows.
6 For example, 3.3 percent of the respondents who were between 54 and 66 in 1994 and 1996 were observed to be working full-time in 1996 and either fully or partially retired in 1994. In the simulations, 3.2 percent of the respondents who were between 54 and 66 in 1994 and 1996 were simulated to be working full-time in 1996 and fully or partially retired in 1994.
IV. Simulating the Effects of Social Security Rule Changes on Retirement Trends
The effects on retirement of evolving Social Security policies are simulated by altering the budget constraint described above. We begin with the assumption that each person in the Health and Retirement Study is covered by whatever set of Social Security rules has governed the benefits the person is actually scheduled to receive. We then ask what happens to retirement outcomes when these rules are changed. In particular, we consider the effects of changing the normal retirement age, the earnings test and the delayed retirement credit. (We did not consider the effects of changing the covered earnings limits.)
6 Reversals from full or partial retirement in one year to full time work in the next. 1992-1994 1994-1996 1996-1998 1998-2000 2000-2002 Observed 2.3 3.3 3.0 3.6 2.3 Simulated 3.9 3.2 2.7 3.1 3.3
Year
Our approach is to present the numbers falling in different retirement states by age in Table 6 , and the corresponding flows among retirement states in Table 7 . Under each outcome, we present the simulated numbers first for the actual rules that governed the behavior of the person during their lifetime, then in the following column advancing the Social Security rules as if they came from a cohort six years younger, and in a final comparison advancing the rules by another six years, applying the Social Security rules that would apply to a cohort twelve years younger. We leave all other aspects of earnings, pensions and health constant.
To facilitate an understanding of how the changing Social Security rules affect retirement outcomes, Tables 8 and 9 present the differences in the outcomes, using outcomes under Social Security rules for those six years younger compared to the baseline outcome (zero years younger), then comparing outcomes using Social Security rules for those twelve years younger than the HRS cohort compared to outcomes under Social Security rules for those six years younger, and finally comparing outcomes under Social Security rules for those twelve years younger compared to the outcomes under the baseline Social Security rules.
A. Baseline Results
First consider baseline results where retirement outcomes are predicted using the actual rules that will apply to each of the relevant individuals in the Health and Retirement Study.
Columns 1, 4, 7 and 10 of Table 6 show retirement outcomes under actual rules that applied to the HRS cohort, which include the normal retirement age and delayed retirement credit dependent on year of birth, and the earnings test as the respondent experienced it. By age 60, from columns 1 and 4, 60.3 percent are still working full time, with 50.4 percent still on their long term job, and another 9.9 percent of the population working on a full time job after having retired. Still another 9.9 percent is partially retired, leaving 29.8 percent completely retired. By age 62, the fraction working on the main job declines to about one third, with another 7.4 percent working full time after retiring, and 15.3 percent partially retired, so that 56.1 percent of the population is working at all, with 60 percent of them still on their main job. By age 65, only 15.9 percent are working on their main job, with 7.4 percent working full time after having retired, and 17.1 percent partially retired. Thus by 65 as many older men are partially retired as are working on their main job. By age 65, 59.6 percent of the married male population is fully retired, out of the labor force entirely. By age 69, 7.9 percent are working full time on their main job, 8.3 percent are working full time after having retired, and 16.6 percent are partially retired. part time work is of the same order of magnitude, and is shown in column 10. However, there is a spike in the flow into part time work at age 62, with 8.7 percent of the population entering part time work. As can be seen by comparing columns 1, 10 and 13, until age 65 most of those entering part time work come from full employment. After age 65, more than half of those entering part time work come from full retirement.
It is also of interest to compare the flows in Table 7 with the corresponding stocks in Table 6 . From age 62 on, the fraction partially retired in Table 6 is roughly 15 percent to 17 percent. After age 62, the flow into partial retirement from Table 7 is about 4 percentage points each year. This suggests an average duration of partial retirement of about four years.
B. Changes in Retirement Outcomes with Changing Social Security Rules
Remembering that the underlying levels of outcomes and flows are available in Tables 6 and 7, we turn now to the differences in retirement outcomes and retirement flows that result from differences in Social Security rules affecting each cohort. These differences in retirement outcomes are shown in Table 8 and 9. The first clear finding from the top half of each table, i.e., through age 61, is that differences in the Social Security rules that apply to different cohorts have virtually no effect on retirement outcomes or flows. Although the forward looking agents simulated in this model will shape their behavior at younger ages in light of Social Security rules that will affect their benefits in later years, there appears to be no differences in incentives resulting from differences in the rules among cohorts. Thus the trend to earlier retirement observed for those in their fifties in the underlying data is not the result of changing Social Security rules.
Starting at age 62, there is a small effect of Social Security rule changes on retirement outcomes. From Table 8 , columns 3 and 6, accelerating the rules by 12 years would reduce the number working full time at age 62 by 2.1 percentage points; 1.4 percentage points on the main job, and 0.7 percentage points for those working full time after they had previously retired. With 40.8 percent of the 62 year old population working full time under baseline conditions, the reduction in full time work due to Social Security rule changes amounts to 5 percent of the 62 year old workers at full time employment under the baseline rules. In Table 9 there is a corresponding difference in the flow of those retiring from full time work at age 62.
In contrast, for 65 year old workers, we see from Table 8 Table 9 , from 63 to 65, under the Social Security rules applying to younger compared to older cohorts, the net percent retiring from full time work is lower by a point or two. From ages 67 to 69, the percent retiring from full time work is increased by the new rules.
VI. Summary and Conclusions:
For many decades, researchers observed a trend toward earlier retirement. Near the end of the last century, the trend to earlier retirement appears to have ceased. Moreover, respondent reports as to their expected retirement dates suggest that further declines in labor force participation of older workers are unlikely in the near term, and that retirement rates may continue at current levels, or may even decline in the first decade of the twenty first century, increasing labor supply of older workers.
One aim of this paper is to examine descriptive statistics to document recent trends in 
